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ABSTRACT 
Disruption of function of left, but not right, lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) with low-frequency 
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) increased choices of immediate rewards over 
larger delayed rewards. rTMS did not change choices involving only delayed rewards or 
valuation judgments of immediate and delayed rewards, providing causal evidence for a neural 
LPFC-based self-control mechanism in intertemporal choice. 
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Every day, we make decisions that trade off short-term and long-term consequences. In such 
intertemporal choices, between a sooner-smaller (SS) and a later-larger (LL) reward, humans and 
other animals exhibit impatience, particularly if immediate rewards are available1. Steep 
discounting of delayed rewards has been implicated in suboptimal behaviors, such as insufficient 
saving for retirement, substance abuse, and non-response to climate change. The neural basis of 
intertemporal choice is still intensively debated, with three recent neural accounts: a single-
valuation,2 a dual-valuation,3 and a self-control account. The first two reflect important fMRI 
studies of intertemporal choice. The third is based only on indirect evidence from fMRI4–6 and 
rTMS7 studies; so far, no study has provided causal evidence to investigate self-control 
mechanisms in intertemporal choice. 
The three accounts mostly agree on brain regions involved (ventral striatum, medial-prefrontal 
cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, lateral-prefrontal cortex, LPFC), but substantially differ on the 
specifics (see Supplemental Online Materials, SOM, for details). Both single- and dual-valuation 
accounts assume the choice of an option results directly from the comparison of their valuations, 
without additional intervening processes such as self-control. The self-control account, in 
contrast, assumes that a tempting option (an immediate SS) might be valued more highly than an 
alternative (a delayed LL), but that the LL might still be chosen, because of intervening self-
control processes. The (dorsal) LPFC has been implicated in self-control6–8, making it a prime 
target for a brain stimulation study. 
Transient disruption of LPFC with rTMS thus provides a crucial test for the need of a self-
control component in intertemporal choice models. Both dual- and single-valuation accounts 
predict that whatever effect LPFC disruption might have on choice should be reflected in option 
valuations, since choice follows directly from valuation. In contrast, the self-control account 
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predicts that choice can be influenced without altering valuation (more specific predictions in 
SOM). 
To causally test for LPFC’s involvement in intertemporal self-control processes, 52 
participants received a 15-minute train of 1 Hz low-frequency rTMS to either left or right LPFC 
(left and right rTMS groups), or sham rTMS (sham control group) (see SOM for details regarding 
all materials and methods, details about results, and additional analyses). Participants completed 
three tasks: A choice task of 36 binary choices between SS and LL options (18 now trials with 
immediate SS; 18 not-now trials with delayed SS and LL), the relative differences in SS/LL-
magnitudes ranged from small (LL 0.5% larger than SS) to large (LL 75% larger than SS); a 
valuation task, rating the attractiveness of 12 single options taken from the choice set; a choice-
titration task (since choice-titrations showed the same results as the choice task, it is described in 
SOM). Each task was administered twice, first immediately after the rTMS train (Task 
Administration 1, TA1) and again 30 minutes later (TA2), after rTMS effects can be expected to 
have dissipated9. We compared data both between the rTMS groups and within-groups across the 
two task administrations. 
The self-control account predicts LPFC disruption to specifically increase impatient choice for 
immediate rewards (i.e., now trials)—as they are particularly tempting and require the most self-
control—most strongly for intermediate relative differences as subjective discounted values of SS 
and LL are close, resulting in increased temptation and choice conflict.  
The data showed significant differences for left vs. sham and left vs. right groups for now 
trials of TA1 (P = .006 and .008, respectively, Fig. 1a). All other comparisons were non-
significant (TA1 now trials sham vs. right; all TA1 not-now comparisons, Fig. 1b; all TA2 now 
and not-now comparisons, Fig. 1c–d). This between-groups comparison was replicated by a 
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within-groups comparison. In addition, both analyses showed that the left rTMS effects in TA1 
were significantly stronger for now than not-now trials. 
As expected, the rTMS effect was particularly strong for now trials with intermediate relative 
differences in reward magnitudes. In Fig. 1a, the left rTMS effects in TA1 now trials were indeed 
significantly stronger for intermediate than small and large relative differences, as confirmed by 
both the within (P = .005) and between (P = .01) comparisons. 
In contrast, valuations of single options showed no effect of either rTMS or task 
administration in both analyses (P's .15 to .90). Yet valuation showed the same sensitivity to the 
reward magnitude and time of delivery (P's < .001). Since the independence of valuation from the 
effects of rTMS is crucial for the self-control account, we conducted follow-up analyses to 
corroborate these results and rule out alternative explanations, such as lower diagnostic sensitivity 
or statistical power of the valuation task, and decay of the rTMS effect (see SOM). 
Finally, we examined reversals between the preferences implicit in the valuation task and the 
choices in TA1 now trials. The two valuation accounts predict no systematic preference reversals 
(PRs) between valuations and choices. The self-control account predicts that intact self-control 
leads to increased numbers of self-controlled PRs where the LL is chosen although the immediate 
SS is valued more highly, but that temporarily impaired self-control produces an increase in 
impulsive PRs (the SS is chosen despite higher LL valuation). Results were consistent with self-
control predictions (see Table 1; self-controlled PRs: P < .001; impulsive PRs: P = .034). 
In summary, we found transient disruption of the left, but not right, LPFC by rTMS led to 
increased choosing of immediately-available rewards (lateralization discussion in SOM). No 
effects were found for trials involving only delayed rewards nor 30 minutes after rTMS, when 
rTMS effects had worn off. In contrast, no effects were found for valuation. We also found the 
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twofold PR pattern of differences in self-controlled and impulsive PRs predicted by the self-
control account.  
Taken together, these results implicate the left LPFC as a crucial neural substrate for self-
control processes in intertemporal choice. Our results are consistent with several possible neural 
implementations of how the LPFC exerts self-control in intertemporal choice, which should be 
investigated in future research. Possible implementations might work via the modulation of 
activity in valuation regions, via input into valuation areas, via differential influence of attention 
given to magnitude versus timing of rewards, or via a more direct influence on choice such as the 
inhibition of a prepotent response (i.e., the tempting immediate SS)6,8. Regardless of their neural 
implementation, our paper is the first to provide causal evidence that self-control processes 
should be incorporated into existing neural models of intertemporal choice. 
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Figure Legend 
 
Figure 1.  Proportion of patient choices (LL) as a function of the relative difference between 
magnitude of SS and LL. Lines indicate the proportion of LL choices for left, right, and sham 
rTMS groups. Panel 1a depicts now trials in TA1; 1b depicts now trials in TA2; 1c and 1d show 
the same for not-now trials (largest s.e.m. for difference left vs. sham in each panel is shown). 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Left, Right, and Sham rTMS Group: Frequencies (in %) for Combinations of Actual Choices 
Versus Valuation-Implied Preferences of SS and LL in Now Trials Immediately After rTMS Train. 
Valuation-
Implied 
Preference 
 
Actual Choice
Left rTMS Right rTMS Sham rTMS 
 SS  LL SS LL SS  LL 
SS  34  6 33 16 30  12 
LL  12  48 6 45 8  50 
 
Note. Numbers represent the percentages of SS/LL combinations for actual choices versus preferences derived from 
valuations. Arrows indicate the increased number of impulsive PRs (left rTMS) and the increased number of self-
controlled PRs (right and sham rTMS). 
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